Abstract-Security protocols are the basis of security in networks. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that these protocols function correctly. However, it is difficult to design security protocols that are immune to malicious attack, since good analysis techniques are lacking. In this paper, the current main analysis techniques using Colored Petri Nets (CP-Nets) for analysis of security protocols are introduced. Based on the techniques, a new method using CP-Nets for the analysis of security protocols is presented. Specially, in the new method, an intruder CP-Net model is presented that provides an open-ended base for the integration of multiple attack tactics. This is a viable approach to overcome the state space explosion problem. Furthermore, the automated analysis tools CPN Tools is used. The Andrew secure RPC protocol is chosen to illustrate how a security protocol is analyzed using the new method. After model checking, an attack is found which the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe. These are stunning confirmations of the validity of the new method for analyzing security protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of security applications, network security has become an important issue, and security protocols are the basis of security in networks. Therefore, it is essential to ensure these protocols correctly. Unfortunately, it is difficult to design a robustness and effective security protocol for networks. Not only because of the characteristics of networks, but also because good analysis techniques are lacking.
In this paper, we compare the current main techniques using Colored Petri Nets (CP-Nets) [1] to analyze the security protocols. Based on the techniques, we present a new and promising method using CP-Nets for the analysis of security protocols. We adopt the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model [2] and present a CP-Net intruder model that provides an open-ended base for the integration of multiple attack tactics. This is a viable approach to overcome the state space explosion problem. Furthermore, we show how to use the automated analysis tools CPN Tools [3] in the construction and model checking of the net models. Finally, we use the new method to model and analysis the Andrew secure RPC protocol fixed in [4] which uses the symmetric keys. In the example, we first introduce a CP-Net for the Andrew secure RPC protocol. Then, an intruder model is developed and integrated into the protocol model. Model checking is performed at last. In the model checking, two methods are used. One exploits the provided state space exploration functions and another is simulation implementation. After model checking and the state space analysis, an attack is found which the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe [5] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the main analysis methods currently using Petri Nets for analysis of security protocols. And a new method using CP-Nets to analyze security protocols is presented. Section 3 introduces the Andrew secure RPC protocol and its fixes [4] - [7] . In Section 4, a CP-Net for the Andrew secure RPC protocol fixed in [4] is introduced. Then, an intruder model is developed and integrated into the protocol model. In Section 5, model checking is performed in CPN Tools. After model checking and the state space analysis, an attack is found. Finally, we conclude the work and suggest future research in Section 6.
II. SECURITY PROTOCOLS ANALYSIS METHOD USING COLORED PETRI NETS
In this section, the definitions of Petri Nets and Colored Petri Nets are presented first. Then, the current main techniques using CP-Nets to analyze the security protocols are compared. Based on the techniques, we present a new method using CP-Nets to analyze the security protocols.
A. Petri Nets
Petri Nets are presented by Carl Adam Petri during his Ph.D. thesis in 1962. A Petri Net is a graphical and mathematical tool to verify systems and protocols. Petri Nets in the graphical forms are like flowcharts and network diagrams, while in mathematical forms, they are like algebra and logic subjects.
Definition 1:
In a formal way, A Petri Net is a tuple [8] : ( , , , ) PN P T A N  In the tuple, (1) P is a finite set of Places.
(2) T is a finite set of Transitions. (3) A is a finite set of Arcs such that:
B. Colored Petri Nets
There are two forms of Petri Nets: ordinary Petri Nets and high level Petri Nets. CP-Nets which belong to the high level Petri Nets.
Definition 2:
Within set theory, a Multi-set of S can be defined as a function from S to R where S is a non-empty set and R is a non-positive integers set [9] .
Multi-set M: 
Definition 3:
In a formal way, A CP-Net is a tuple [1, 8]: ( , , , , , , , , ) CPN P T A N C G E I  In the tuple, (1)  is a finite set of non-empty types, also called colored sets. (2) P is a finite set of Places. (3) T is a finite set of Transitions. (4) A is a finite set of Arcs such that:
(5) N is a node function. It is defined from A into -colored over arcs‖ P T T P    .
(6) C is a color function. It is defined from P into  -token‖. (7) G is a guard function. It is defined from T into expressions such that: -Boolean function with probability.‖ : Unfortunately, the methods have the problems below: 1. Generally, a protocol model is applicable only to one specific attack, and can only describe one possible insecure state (Fig. 1). 2. Automated analysis tools of CP-Nets are not be used. Thus, the following features have not been used: arc inscription, guard expression, CPN/ML statements, fusion places, and functions on the values of the colored tokens. Having such features would result in having smaller, easier to understand, and extendable models. CPN Tools [3] developed at the University of Aarhus is a graphical ML-based tool for editing and analyzing CP-Nets. Many authors report on projects that investigated the practicability of using CP-nets and the CPN tools for the specification, verification, validation, or performance analysis of the considered system. Ruilong Wu and Taoshen Li present a checking security protocol method based on CP-Nets [24] . In this method, an intruder model is given and CPN Tools is used. To verify the method, two authentication protocols using asymmetric keys are analyzed. However when the intruder model is given, the state space explosion problem may follow. For instance, they could not obtain the result at the analysis to TMN protocol, because the state space is too large and there are too many dead markings in their model. Thus, the attempt to enumerate all meaningful messages that the intruder can send will inevitably lead to an enormous branching of the resulting state space.
D. A Security Protocols Analysis New Method using Colored Petri Nets
Based on the foresaid analysis, we present a new technique using CP-Nets. It is a finite state analysis method. Thus, it involves modeling the protocol as a CPNet, then an automated tool CPN tools is used to generate all possible states. Insecurities are discovered if an insecure state is reachable in the CPN occurrence graph. Specially, we present a new intruder model.
In protocol analysis, we follow these steps:
1. Build a model of protocol with no intruder: In this step,
(1) Analyzing every sentence of the protocol, and then using CPN ML notation. We declare the color sets, functions, variables, and constants that will be used in the net inscriptions of the CPN model; (2) Building a communication model in accordance with the order of sending and receiving messages.
2. Add the intruder to the model. Following the intruder model of Dolev-Yao [2] , the intruder has to be modeled with the highest imaginable strength so that all possible attacks on the protocol can be identified. Considering the public channel, the intruder has full control over it. According to the model, he can then carry out the following actions:
(1) Tapping and storage of all messages exchanged via the public channel. (2) Forwarding, rerouting and blocking of messages. (3) Generation of forged messages using tapped, randomly generated and obsolete data and encryption techniques. (4) Decryption of cryptographs if the intruder has a matching key. (5) The intruder has the ability of a normal principal, so, he can take part in the protocol. We adopt the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model. Meanwhile, for overcome the foresaid problem of intruder model, we aim in a less general but complementary approach for the generation of new messages based on an open-ended base of predefined attack tactics. The structure and the number of all possible fake messages are restricted by the patterns and the number of initial messages of the available attack tactics. The intruder model can be thought as two concurrent processes, where the first aims to intercept exchanged messages and the second performs a nondeterministically selected attack tactic against the ongoing protocol sessions (Fig. 2) 
Model checking the CP-Net model of integrated into an intruder.
In the model checking, two methods are used. One exploits the provided state space exploration functions and another is simulation implementation. We run a simulation using the Simulation tools of CPN Tools. In the state space exploration check, the steps are as follows:
(1) Enter the state space. 
III. ANDREW SECURE RPC PROTOCOL
The best way to explain how a protocol is analyzed using the new method is by example. In this paper, the Andrew secure RPC protocol is specified, and we step through the analysis. In this section, we first introduce our sample protocol, the Andrew secure RPC protocol [6] . It allows two agents, who already share a key AB K , to 
In [4] , this protocol is analyzed using BAN logic, and a weakness is exposed. Further, a correction to the Andrew secure RPC protocol was suggested:
1. :,
A N  Although the correction is stronger than the original one, in [5] , an attack using two parallel runs of the fixed protocol is found. Gavin Lowe finds an attack on it using two parallel runs. He suggests change the second message to include an encrypted copy of the sender's identity: 
A. CP-Net Model of the Andrew Secure RPC Protocol
Data is modeled by tokens each belonging to a special data type called the color set of a token. The token color is the actual assignment of values to this token. The CPNet model for the Andrew secure RPC protocol fixed in [4] is shown in Fig. 3 (declarations) and Fig. 4 (the CPNNet). In the following, names of places, transitions, and variables of the CPN-Net model are written in italic style.
Declarations:
Referring to Fig. 3 , a constant, u, is defined to represent the maximum number of the principals in the protocol, another constant, m, represents the number of the nonces. Two color sets, INT, and NO, are declared to the sets of integers. Color set PART models the principals. Color set N models the nonces. Color set PROC, a subset of PROC1, models the principals who are performing the protocol. Color set INT_KK models the shared key of the two principals. Two color sets, CRY1and CRY2, are declared for modeling the cryptographs in the message. After the protocol carries out, Run1_4 and Run2_4 save the tokens which can prove that the protocol has already carried out. Places M1, M2, M3, and M4 hold the state of the message in the public channel. Thus, the intruder can modify the messages, replay the messages or pass the messages without any modifications. ( 
B. CP-Net Model of the Andrew Secure RPC Protocol Integrated into an Intruder Model
The CP-Net model for the Andrew secure RPC protocol integrated into an intruder model is shown in Fig.  5 (the CP-Net of protocol) and Fig. 6 (the CP-Net of intruder).
Declarations:
The intruder has the ability of a normal principal, so, he can play the role of the Initiator or Responder. Thus, the value of constant, u, becomes to 5. The other declarations of the new CP-Net model are the same as the ones shown in Fig. 5 .
CP-Net Model:
There are two types of CP-Nets: non-hierarchical CPNets and hierarchical CP-Nets [3] . Effective CP-Net modeling requires the ability to distribute a CP-net across multiple pages, so as to divide it into modules small enough to keep track of. CP-Net hierarchy is able to organize a CP-net into submodels. Therefore, the model for the Andrew secure RPC protocol integrated into an intruder model is established using the hierarchical CPNets.
CP-Net hierarchy allows us to construct large CP-nets by combining smaller nets. It supports a method for defining sets of places so that anything that happens to each place in a set also happens to all the other places in the set. The places are then functionally identical. Such places are called fusion places, and a set of fusion places is a fusion set. Fig. 6 illustrates an intruder between Initiator and Responder. We observe that the intruder can modify and replay the outgoing messages from the Initiator to the Responder and vice versa.
C. CP-Net Model of an Intruder Model of the Andrew Secure RPC Protocol
We study the case of man-in-middle attack, although different attack models can be applied to the Andrew secure RPC protocol. Figure 6 . CP-Net model of intruder of the Andrew secure RPC protocol. In this section, model checking of the two CP-Net models is performed in CPN Tools. In the model checking, two methods are used. One exploits the provided state space exploration functions and another is simulation implementation. After model checking and the state space analysis, an attack is found which the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe [5] .
A. State Space Analysis of the Andrew Secure RPC Protocol CP-Net Model
To analyze the desired properties of the Andrew secure RPC protocol, we firstly check the state space standard report generated by CPN Tools.
A part of the report is listed below: The report shows that a full state space with 19 nodes and 18 arcs is generated. We also found 2 dead markings in the state space, which are nodes18, 19. We can use the state space exploration functions shown in Fig. 7 to know the tokens in the places Run1_4 and Run2_4 of node 18. From Fig. 7 we can know that the Initiator is p(1) and the Responder is p (2) in this implementation of the protocol. In addition, p(1) and p(2) have the same believes. There is a similar result to node 19. 
B. State Space Analysis of CP-Net Model of the Andrew Secure RPC Protocol Integrated into an Intruder Model
In the same way, we firstly check the state space standard report of CP-Net model integrated into an intruder model.
A part of the report is listed below: Statistics  ------------------------------------------------------------------- The report shows that a full state space with 79 nodes and 78 arcs is generated. It is pleasing to see that the state spaces are comparatively smaller. We only found 6 dead markings in the state space. However, the report does not give the all dead markings. Thus, the function ListDeadMarkings( ) is used, and the result is shown in Fig. 8 . Additionally, we use the state space exploration functions shown in Fig. 9 to know the tokens in the places Run1_4 and Run2_4 of node 79. From Fig. 9 , we can see that p(1) and p(2) do not have the same believes. To get more details, we run a simulation to the CP-Net. Variable i is bound to 1 and j is bound to 2. After the simulation, we get the following implementation sequence. Each line in the occurrence sequence represents a step that has a single binding element. Each line contains the following information: the page name, the transition, and the binding. For instance, the line identified by (*), on its right side, represents the step (Sent4 in the RPC, no = 1, n1 = n (1), j = 1, i = 2). Coincidentally, this attack is the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe [5] . In fact, we have analyzed the original protocol and its fixes in [4] and [5] using Rubin logic, and we also present a new fix in which the weakness no longer exists [7] .
Ⅵ. CONCLUSION
Based on the current security protocol analysis techniques using CP-Nets, we have presented a new and promising method that uses CP-Nets for the analysis of security protocols. The main contribution of this work is a CP-Net intruder model that provides an open-ended base for the integration of multiple attack tactics. This is a viable approach to overcome the state space explosion problem. But also, the presented intruder model is open to integrate more specialized attack. Furthermore, we show how to use CPN Tools in the construction and model checking of the net models. Finally, we use the new method to model and analysis the Andrew secure RPC protocol fixed in [4] .
In the example, we a CP-Net for the Andrew secure RPC protocol fixes in [4] has been presented. And then an intruder model is developed and integrated into the protocol model. Model checking is performed in CPN Tools. In the model checking, two methods are used. After model checking and the state space analysis, an attack is found which the same as the one found by Gavin Lowe. For the sake of simplicity, we use the hierarchal CP-Nets in our analysis of the protocol.
In the future, we would like to formalize the different type of attack tactics and give more exact CP-Nets models of intruder, and to use the new method to analyze other security protocols. We are also interested in the other state space reduction methods to overcome the state space explosion problem in the specialized CP-Nets.
